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Les articles 7 (principes) et 8 (objectifs) de l’accord de l’OMC sur les aspects des droits
de propriété intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce (ADPIC) revêtent une importance
capitale dans le texte de l’accord, mais ne figurent que de manière parcimonieuse dans
le raisonnement de son Organe de règlement des différends. Cette divergence s’accentue
compte tenu de trois facteurs clés. Premièrement, la démarche novatrice des négociateurs
de l’ADPIC, qui ont tenu à inclure dans le texte exécutoire une vaste déclaration d’intention.
Deuxièmement, le renforcement de ces dispositions qu’apportait en 2001 la déclaration de
Doha touchant l’ADPIC et la santé publique. Enfin, la répétition textuelle de ces dispositions
dans d’autres instruments mondiaux de PI, en particulier le partenariat transpacifique,
l’accord commercial anti-contrefaçon et le plan d’action de l’OMPI pour le développement.
Tous ces facteurs concourent à mieux étudier le sens et l’application des articles 7 et 8.
Cet article se propose de participer à cette étude en soumettant à une analyse textuelle
détaillée chacun des éléments de ces dispositions. Comme nous le démontrerons, la
nécessité, le caractère raisonnable, la cohérence et la bonne foi sont des principes juridiques
que l’on retrouve dans les articles 7 et 8. Ces dispositions reconnaissent de plus un principe
central d’interprétation – celui de l’autonomie des États en matière de réglementation. Cela
inclut – et même dépasse – le respect des choix politiques nationaux et la reconnaissance
d’une méthode de calibration centrée sur l’État pour guider l’application de l’ADPIC et de
toute autre entente auquel il participe.
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A STRIKING FEATURE OF THE World Trade Organization’s Agreement on

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)1 is the bold expression
of purpose contained within the operative sections of the text. While it is
commonplace to see broad declarations of intent within the preambular sections
of key international intellectual property (IP) treaties,2 the TRIPS Agreement
is the first to articulate such objectives in the body of an IP treaty and give
them apparent operative force. Articles 7 and 8 refer to the “Objectives” and
“Principles” of the treaty regime respectively:
Article 7 – Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.
Article 8 – Principles
1.

Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement.

2.

Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights by rights holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.

The inclusion of these Articles in Part I of the Agreement, “General Provisions
and Basic Principles,” recognizes that they are structural provisions that affect all
other areas of the Agreement.3 These provisions “overarch the object and purpose
of individual standards of protection in the other parts of the TRIPS Agreement.”4

1.
2.

3.
4.

1869 UNTS 299, 15 April 1994 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS].
See e.g. the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September
1886, 828 UNTS 221 (entered into force 9 September 1886, last amended 28 September
1979); WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996,1996 36 ILM 65 (entered into
force 20 May 2002).
Graeme B Dinwoodie & Rochelle C Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience
of the International Intellectual Property Regime (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2012) at 109-111.
Susy Frankel, “Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation
Disputes” (2009) 12:4 J Intl Econ L 1023 at 1037.
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Consequently, Articles 7 and 8 “are to be systematically applied in the
implementation and interpretation of the Agreement.”5 The structural,
overarching, and systematic application of these provisions draws legal authority
from the General Rule of Interpretation codified in Article 31.1 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This states that: “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”6
Established as binding on the WTO when interpreting all covered agreements,7
the VCLT prescribes a single and holistic rule of interpretation that emphasizes
the importance of the treaty language. Nonetheless, any meaning attributed to
the text must be determined in the context of the treaty and in light of its object
and purpose.8 Articles 7 and 8 are relevant to the application of the VCLT rule of
interpretation, most significantly by providing context and by illuminating the
object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.9 Support for this understanding is
derived from Article 31.2 of the VCLT, which defines context to include the entire
text, preamble and annexes, as well as any connected agreements or instruments
that have been made between or accepted by all parties. Additionally, designating
Articles 7 and 8 as objectives and principles is a strong indication that these
provisions are relevant for assessing the treaty’s object and purpose.10 In fact,
WTO members have subsequently reinforced this specific role for Articles 7 and
8 through the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.11
5.

Carlos M Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the
TRIPS Agreement (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 93.
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1153 UNTS 331 (entered into force
27 January 1980).
7. WTO, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline: Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996, at 15-16 [US – Gasoline].
8. Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press, 1984) at 119-35.
9. Susy Frankel, “WTO Application of ‘the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public
International Law’ to Intellectual Property” (2006) 46:2 Va J Intl L 366 at 392; Andrew
D Mitchell & Tania Voon, “Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond:
Tension and Conflict in International Law” (2009) 43:3 J World Trade 571 at 573. A brief
discussion of the good faith obligations, including good faith interpretation derived from
Article 31.1 VCLT, can be found at the text accompanying footnotes 111-114. For a
detailed discussion of the good faith obligations created by Article 7 see Alison Slade, “Good
Faith and the TRIPS Agreement: Putting Flesh on the Bones of the TRIPS ‘Objectives’”
(2014) 63:2 ICLQ 353.
10. Frankel, supra note 9.
11. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 4th
Sess [Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement].
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Given that Member States took positive steps to include expressions of general
intent within the operative section of the text, it is remarkable that Articles 7
and 8 have received only minimal attention from the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB).12 Much has been written about the DSB’s insubstantial analysis and
application of these provisions in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products13 and European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.14 In both cases the panels
acknowledge Articles 7 and 8, but seem to accept them as merely illustrative of
the inherent characteristics of the international intellectual property system with
little if any legal value in their own right. While the decisions in Canada – Term of
Protection15 and US – s211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 199816 suggest a more
active role for these provisions, most notably with Article 7 acting as “a form
of the good faith principle,”17 neither panel takes the opportunity to provide a
detailed understanding. This article seeks to remedy this neglect. The following
analysis dissects the legislative language of Articles 7 and 8 in order to better
realize its meaning, relevance, and application.
As stressed by the WTO Appellate Body, “[t]he fundamental rule of treaty
interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret the words actually
used by the agreement under examination.”18 As discussed above, the ordinary
12. In contrast, these articles have received significant attention from WTO political
representatives and from the academic community. See WTO, Communication from India
– Clarifying TRIPS: A Confidence-Building Measure, IP/C/W/214, 6 October 2000; WTO,
Minutes of Meeting (held on 28-29 February 2012) IP/C/M/69, 15 May 2012, at para 254;
Peter K Yu, “The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement” (2009) 46:4 Hous L
Rev 979; Edson Beas Rodrigues Jr, The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement:
Promoting Sustainable Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
13. WTO, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products: Report of the Panel, WT/
DS114/R, 17 March 2000 [Canada – Pharmaceuticals].
14. WTO, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WTO Doc WT/DS174/R [EC – TMs & GIs]; WTO,
European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs, WTO Doc WT/DS290/R. For a critique of the DSB’s application of
Articles 7 and/or 8 in these cases see, Slade, supra note 9 at 353-357.
15. WTO, Canada – Term of Patent Protection: Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS170/AB/R,
18 September 2000.
16. WTO, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998: Report of the Panel,
WT/DS176/R, 6 August 2001 [US – s211].
17. Ibid at 8.57.
18. European Communities—EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)
(Complaint by the United States and Canada) (1998) WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R and WT
DS48/AB/R at para 181 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>
[emphasis added].
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meaning attributed to the words used must be determined in light of a treaty’s
context and object and purpose. Yet, if we follow the VCLT principle of treaty
interpretation the analysis becomes somewhat circular: Articles 7 and 8 provide
context, and object and purpose to aid in the interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, but before they can be used in this way they must first be interpreted
themselves. As observed by Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek:
[When interpreting programmatic provisions of a treaty it is] evident that the process
of interpretation prescribed by Article 31 para.1 of the VCLT can only be used with
modification for that end. It is not possible to be guided in the interpretation of a
treaty by its object and purpose when those have to be elucidated first by interpreting
the treaty.19

How then are programmatic provisions, such as Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement, to be interpreted? The VCLT is silent on how to establish the object
and purpose of a treaty or how to interpret provisions that seek to express such
general intent.20 According to Sir Ian Sinclair, when seeking the object and
purpose of a treaty “the text is the expression of the intention of the parties;
and it is to that expression of intent that one must first look.”21 The following
analysis will therefore be structured according to the individual textual elements
expressed within Articles 7 and 8. Yet, Jan Klabbers cautions against using text
alone to define a treaty’s object and purpose:
[U]ndue reliance on the text alone may result in losing sight of the object and
purpose of the treaty itself, and instead give rise to propositions relating to object
and purpose of singular provisions or parts of provisions, thus resulting in a blunting
of the analytical potential of the notion of object and purpose.22

To avoid this interpretative trap, the analysis of the specific words and
phrases will call upon other relevant materials to add authoritative meaning
to the text. These sources include, inter alia, other provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, subsequent agreements between the parties, the wider WTO legal
system, and the policy foundations of intellectual property protection and the
19. Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?”
(1998) 3 Aust Rev Intl & Eur L 311 at 333. See also David S Jonas & Thomas N Saunders,
“The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative Methods” (2010) 43:3 Vand J
Transnat’l L 565 at 581-582.
20. Marco Slotboom, A Comparison of WTO and EC Law: Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for
Treaty Interpretation? (London: Cameron May, 2006) at 53.
21. Sinclair, supra note 8 at 131. This approach reinforces the Article 31.1 emphasis on the text
as the primary source of interpretative guidance.
22. Jan Klabbers, “Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties” (1997) 8
Finnish YB of Intl L 138 at 157.
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multilateral trading system. While having recourse to a wide range of supporting
materials, the author recognizes that “introducing obligations through the back
door of object and purpose, after those have been refused entry through the
front door” should be avoided.23 This is especially so in light of Article 3.2 of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which makes it clear that
the “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”24 Therefore, in order
to balance this interpretative caution against the need to operationalize Articles
7 and 8, the analysis remains firmly grounded in the language actually used,
and the supporting materials are those that can be sensibly rationalized in the
international IP context.25 This is not to say that the following analysis expresses
the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement in its entirety or that it is the
definitive word on the interpretation and application of Articles 7 and 8. The
author accepts that defining the object and purpose of a treaty in the abstract
will rarely produce a conclusive result.26 Nevertheless, where object and purpose
are expressed directly, as in Articles 7 and 8, detailed analyses of the individual
textual elements can facilitate stronger analogies with existing legal rules and
principles. This article will augment existing academic writings to provide
meaningful insight into how these steering provisions can be given full effect by
State Parties and by those interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.27
The replication of Articles 7 and 8 within the operative sections of other
international and national intellectual property instruments underscores this
growing need for a deeper understanding. The language of these provisions
can now be found in the final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),28
23. Ibid at 159.
24. WTO, Understanding on the Rules Governing Disputes 1994, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 40
art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [DSU].
25. Nevertheless, Jan Klabbers notes that indicators of object and purpose are wide ranging
and in some cases even “intuition and common sense” may provide useful guidance. Supra
note 22 at 155.
26. Klabbers, supra note 22 at 160; Jonas & Saunders, supra note 19 at 582. The authors
note that the meaning of object and purpose depends not only on the treaty alone, but its
application to a particular factual problem.
27. Pedro Roffe, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) at 119-127; Yu, supra note 12 at 982-992; Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS
Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 4th ed (London: Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell,
2012) at 227-241; Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data, 4th
ed (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2014).
28. Trans-Pacific Partnership, 4 February 2016, USTR 2010 00014 at arts 18.2-18.3, online:
<ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text>.
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the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),29 the WIPO Development
Agenda,30 and the amended Indian Patents Act 1970.31 It is clear that despite an
apparent wane in the influence of the TRIPS Agreement, due to the proliferation
of bilateral and regional agreements,32 these structural provisions (and the aims
and concerns articulated therein) are independently acquiring wider relevance.33
Reproducing these provisions advocates an enhanced legal and political status in
both national and international IP norm-setting for the objectives and principles
contained therein.34 While it may be premature to suggest that these provisions
are a customary part of the international IP system, their growing use evidently
necessitates a more detailed understanding.
As will be demonstrated below, fundamentally Articles 7 and 8 require those
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to look at interests beyond those directly
related to the acquisition and enforcement of intellectual property rights.35 In
this regard, these provisions reflect, at the international level, the balancing of
interests that has consistently been undertaken at the national level.36 Given that
Articles 7 and 8 acknowledge that intellectual property protection is inescapably
aligned with other important national development objectives, it seems that
these Articles ought, above all, to reinforce national autonomy and, thus,
deference to national policy choices.37 As articulated by Graeme Dinwoodie and
Rochelle Dreyfuss, “international [intellectual property] norms confine national
29. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 1 October 2011, at 2.3 [ACTA].
30. WIPO, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda,
Recommendation 45 of 2007 General Assembly, online: <www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/
agenda/recommendations.html>.
31. The Patents Act, 1970 (India), s 83.
32. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Intellectual Property and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment”
in H Ullrich, RM Hilty, M Lamping & J Drexl, eds, TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to
Market Principles (Berlin: Springer, 2015).
33. Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 164.
34. Alison Slade, “Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement: A Force for Convergence within the
International IP System” (2011) 14:6 J World Intell Prop 413.
35. Jerzy Koopman, “Human Rights Implications of Patenting Biotechnological Knowledge” in
Paul LC Torresmans, ed, Intellectual Property and Human Rights (The Netherlands: Kluwer
Law International, 2008) 533 at 546.
36. Roffe, supra note 27 at 119.
37. TRIPS Agreement, art 1.1 states that “[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
and practice.” See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. See also India—Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (Complaint by the United States)
(1997), WTO Doc WT/DS50/AB/R at para 59 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<docsonline.wto.org> [India – Pharmaceuticals].
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policy choices, but they do not define them.”38 It is only at the national level
that the competing economic and social interests reproduced in these provisions
can be reconciled. In that regard, Articles 7 and 8 would appear to allow each
State significant room to determine appropriate levels of intellectual property
protection for itself. Accordingly, the following analysis articulates a prevailing
principle of national regulatory authority (subject to the WTO requirements of
consistency, necessity, and reasonableness).39 National autonomy is the cardinal
approach to effectively elucidating the objectives and principles of the TRIPS
Agreement and giving them practical effect.
The observations made below will touch upon numerous topics, each
provoking a myriad of issues and complexities, such as the precise interpretative
impact on other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the support these
provisions provide for a human rights framework within the context of the WTO.
However, the intention here is not to address each of these issues in turn, but to
specifically analyze the meaning and scope of the text of these provisions. Only
with a more comprehensive understanding of Articles 7 and 8 will the WTO,
its Member States, and all states that adhere to other national and international
instruments in which these provisions are incorporated better address many of
these intricate and complex questions.

I. ARTICLE 7 – OBJECTIVES
Objective: Of or pertaining to the object or end as the cause of action.40
As the dictionary definition suggests, the fundamental rationale of the TRIPS
Agreement is to realize the aims expressed in Article 7. For this reason Article
7 provides significant insight into the often-posed question—what were
the drafters’ intentions?41 This Article reminds us of the role that intellectual
property rights play in incentivizing creativity and innovation, yet alerts us to
its detrimental side-effects. During negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement many
38. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 3 at 112.
39. In April 2014, the Max-Planck Institute released a “Declaration on Patent Protection.” It
forcefully asserted that “sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system
that best suits their technological capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic
needs and priorities.” “Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty Under
TRIPS” (15 April 2014), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, online: <www.
mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf>.
40. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989) [OED].
41. Yu, supra note 12 at 1022.
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countries stressed the central role intellectual property protection plays in the
process of innovation. Yet many others, particularly developing countries, wished
to recognize and actively correct the negative impact that such protection may
have on economic and social development.42 Therefore, Article 7 requires a
middle ground to be reached that optimizes innovation and promotes social
and economic development, while at the same time lessening the detrimental
consequences of intellectual property protection.
Article 7 is certainly not a comprehensive expression of all the TRIPS
Agreement’s goals.43 Nevertheless, it is the first attempt at defining the underlying
rationale of a multilateral intellectual property instrument.44 In short, Article
7 invokes, at the international level, many of the implicit balancing principles
that have historically been fundamental to national levels of intellectual property
protection.45 Additionally, it unites these national principles with the broader
objectives of the WTO as outlined in the recitals to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organisation.46 Michael Spence observes that:
[L]ike the first recital to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, [Article 7]
expresses a concern for increasing global welfare. Similarly, like the second recital
to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, it demonstrates a particular concern for
developing countries which might be assumed to benefit most from the transfer and
dissemination of technology.47

42. For an analysis of the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement see Duncan Matthews,
Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPs Agreement (London: Routledge, 2002) at
29-45; Gervais, supra note 27 at 3-31.
43. The Preamble is considered to contain the general goals of the TRIPS Agreement,
predominant amongst which is recital 1. However, these general goals should be read
in conjunction with the objectives expressed in Article 7. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,
“Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection”
in Paul LC Torremans, ed, Intellectual Property and Human Rights (The Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2008) 161 at 173-75; Abdulqawi A Yusuf, “TRIPs: Background,
Principles and General Provisions” in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, eds,
Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (London: Kluwer Law
International, 2008) 3 at 11; Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager & Jayashree Watal, eds,
A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2012) at 12-13.
44. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 3 at 110.
45. Ibid.
46. Michael Spence, “Which Intellectual Property Rights are Trade-Related?” in F Francioni
and M Scovazzi, eds, Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (Hart
2001) 263 at 265.
47. Ibid.
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Notwithstanding these comments, Spence draws attention to the difficulties
inherent in a provision that promotes two highly contested functions of the
intellectual property system—the promotion of innovation and the transfer
and dissemination of technology. He argues that this duality makes Article 7
an inadequate tool with which to identify and justify the intellectual property
rights that ought to be included in the TRIPS Agreement.48 Could this be an
underestimation of the drafters’ intended function(s) for Article 7? The provision
is certainly concerned with validating the scope of the TRIPS Agreement by
assessing whether current intellectual property regimes can actually realize the
stated objectives. However, in being the first provision within an international
intellectual property instrument to articulate a set of guiding principles, Article
7 appears to be more widely concerned with the function and aims of the TRIPS
Agreement within the legal systems of both the WTO and the individual Member
States. By prescribing a set of outcomes that are to guide the political and legal
interpreters of the TRIPS Agreement, Article 7 goes beyond merely providing an
introduction to the scope of the Agreement. Hence, it seeks to achieve an optimal
level of intellectual property protection aligned to distinct levels of economic
and social development. Crucially, the appropriate standard of protection will be
achieved when the objectives listed in Article 7 are attained at the national level.49
Accordingly, it would be misguided to argue that the objectives expressed
in Article 7 require a rigid international optimization of intellectual property
standards. First, such an approach would misunderstand the nature of the TRIPS
Agreement. The Agreement lays down a minimum set of intellectual property
rules.50 For instance, nothing in the Agreement prevents Members from adopting
higher thresholds of protection if Members determine that this would be more
conducive to achieving the objectives set out in Article 7.51 More importantly,
the TRIPS Agreement includes numerous “flexibilities” that, if interpreted in
accordance with Articles 7 and 8, provide sufficient elbowroom for Member

48. Ibid at 265-274.
49. Wesley A Cann Jr, “On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need
of Less-Developed Countries for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply
Under A Theory of Progressive Global Constitutionalism” (2004) 25:3 U Pa J Intl Econ L
755 at 808; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 3 at 111.
50. Roffe, supra note 27 at 35.
51. Article 1.1 states that “[m]embers may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law
more extensive protection than is required by the Agreement, provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1
[emphasis added].
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States to tailor their intellectual property regimes to reflect their own unique
economic and social circumstances.52
Secondly, optimal levels of intellectual property protection have been
notoriously difficult to determine, measure, and achieve even at the national
level.53 Consequently, any attempt to attain international optimization would be
naively optimistic and necessarily involve complex calculations of economic and
social welfare that would prove impossible to resolve. As will be shown below,
an analysis of the terminology utilized in Article 7 supports the state-centric
nature of the balancing of interests required.
A. THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 7
1.

“THE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS...”

The opening phrase of Article 7 makes clear that the application of the Article
extends not only to the scope and nature of the rights granted, but also to the
enforcement measures covered by the TRIPS Agreement. More expansively, the
focus of the provision is the broader impact of “intellectual property rights,” not
merely reconciling one provision of TRIPS with another. This has led Peter Yu
to conclude that:
[Article 7] therefore anticipates further balancing within the larger international
trading system. As the WTO Panel declared in United States – Section 110(5) of
the U.S. Copyright Act, “the agreements covered by the WTO form a single,
integrated legal system.” Because “[t]he proper balance of rights and obligations is
an overriding objective of the WTO system,” the objectives and principles of the
TRIPS Agreement need to be considered in relation to this particular objective.54

Therefore, the objectives contained in Article 7 need to be explored not
merely within the discrete application of the TRIPS Agreement, but within
the wider context of the WTO trading system. Viewed as a whole, the WTO
structure regards an optimized trading system as one that acknowledges a wider
purpose. As stated in the opening recital to the Agreement Establishing the World
Trading Organization:
52. “Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement,” World Intellectual Property
Organization, online: <www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/legislative_assistance/
advice_trips.html>.
53. Keith E Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics, 2000) at 28.
54. Yu, supra note 12 at 1007-1008.
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Parties to this Agreement recogniz[e] that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve
the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.55

The second recital goes further in recognizing that positive action is needed
to ensure that developing and least developed nations “secure a share in the
growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.” The Appellate Body has confirmed the unified framework and
“single undertaking” nature of the WTO Agreement,56 thereby making the
WTO’s development objectives applicable to all its Annexes, including the
TRIPS Agreement.
Bearing in mind that intellectual property protection creates legal rights with
monopolistic tendencies, it would be correct to assume that the characterization
and scope of the rights involved should be determined in light of the public
interest criteria mentioned above. Particular consideration should be given
to the level of social and economic development of each State Party and any
circumstances that require the moderation of recognized rights. Any failure in
this regard could undermine the legitimacy of international intellectual property
regimes including TRIPS, the WTO, and the multilateral trading system that it
aims to facilitate.57
2.

“SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO”

The phrase “should contribute to” indicates that Article 7 contains the primary
aims or goals of the Agreement. The assumption is that upon implementation
Member States should seek to realize all the objectives contained within Article 7.

55. 14 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154 (entered into force 1 January 1995).
56. Brazil—Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Complaint by the Philippines) (1997),
WTO Doc WT/DS22/AB/R at 13-14 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<docsonline.wto.org>.
57. Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “WTO Dispute Resolution and the
Preservation of the Public Domain of Science under International Law” in Keith E Maskus
and Jerome H Reichman, eds, International Public Goods and the Transfer of Technology under
a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2005) 861 at 883.
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Hence, this provision expresses standards expected of a successfully functioning
intellectual property regime.
Much has been made of Article 7 being a “should” rather than a “shall”
provision.58 The argument maintains that the word “shall” places a mandatory
obligation on the parties to an agreement, while “should” indicates a lesser
obligation that only encourages parties to achieve the stated aims. This latter
approach regards Article 7 as merely hortatory or aspirational in nature.59 If we
accept this distinction, then as a substantive provision Article 7 will always be
superseded by “shall” provisions or their equivalent.
However, it is generally accepted that the value of Article 7 rests in its ability
to steer the interpretation of these “shall” provisions rather than to impose a
substantive obligation.60 If this is the case then the distinction appears to be
irrelevant. It is not then a case of weighing discrete substantive provisions but
of interpreting the substantive provisions. The “should” provision then adopts
the role of determining what “shall” be achieved. As observed by Pedro Roffe in
the UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, “countries
should frame the applicable rules so as to promote technological innovation
and the transfer and dissemination of technology ‘in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare.’”61 The “should” in this instance recognizes that
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights does not always
result in the various outcomes listed in Article 7, but that it ought to do so.62
In fact, in some instances the protection of intellectual property rights will not
encourage creative output63 and might even stifle the innovation that it aims to
promote. Consequently, Article 7 carries an interpretative function that directs
the application of the Agreement to achieve the stated objectives. This makes
the word “should” central to the whole provision. Therefore, the “should” in
Article 7 indicates an obligation, the nature of which is interpretative rather
than substantive.
58. Correa, supra note 5 at 93; Yu, supra note 12 at 1003; Gervais, supra note 27 at 230.
59. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?” (2004) 71:1
U Chicago L Rev 21 at 22; Margaret Chon, “Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide” (2006) 27:6 Cardoza L Rev 2821 at 2843.
60. Correa, supra note 5 at 93; Gervais, supra note 27 at 239; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss,
supra note 3 at 110.
61. Roffe, supra note 27 at 126 [emphasis added].
62. Correa, supra note 5 at 95.
63. Carlos A Primo Braga, Carsten Fink & Claudia Paz Sepulveda, Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Development: Discussion Paper No 412 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000)
at 27-31; Correa (n 5) 96-97.
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The phrase “contribute to” is also notable. During the negotiation of the
TRIPS Agreement the protection of intellectual property rights was often
promoted as a panacea for many of the social and economic problems facing
developing countries. In short, by implementing higher standards of national
intellectual property protection, states would encourage foreign corporations to
transfer their products or services to the protecting state and even work them
locally. This would lead to the transfer of technology to these nations, thereby
advancing economic expansion and resulting in high standards of living and
social development. Yet the expression “contribute to” confirms that intellectual
property protection can never be such a panacea. It can only be one of many
factors that operate together to promote innovation and the dissemination of
information and technology.64 In this regard, Article 7 acknowledges the linkages
that exist between intellectual property and other factors of development and
requires that such protection be sympathetic to a state’s level of social and
economic development.65
3.

“THE PROMOTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION”

A primary justification for the intellectual property system is the incentive
it provides for advancement in many fields. The introduction of the TRIPS
Agreement extends that stimulus beyond national boundaries. The claim that
intellectual property protection can promote innovation is premised upon the
notion that protectable subject matter is a public good. Innovation, unlike
real property, is non-exhaustible. Once produced it can be utilized extensively
without depleting the social value of the original.66 While this in itself is not
especially problematic, difficulties arise when the creator wishes to exclude others
from utilizing the innovation once it has been disclosed to the public. The new
development or creation can often be reproduced with little cost or effort on
the part of others, thus removing or severely limiting the market for the original
product or process. By receiving a set of exclusive rights for a set period of time,
rights holders are able to exclude others from commercially exploiting the protected
subject matter. This enhances the opportunity to recoup the expenditure incurred
in developing the product or service and increases the prospect of additional
financial rewards by securing the market for the rights holder. Accordingly,
64. Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 181-82.
65. Ibid at 100.
66. William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003) at 11-25; Matthew Fisher, “Classical
Economics and Philosophy of the Patent System” (2005) IPQ 1 at 4-5.
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in light of intellectual property protection, an individual or corporation can
create and exploit the manifestation of their efforts secure in the knowledge that
a competitor cannot free-ride at their expense. This rationale behind intellectual
property protection is often difficult to reconcile with those of free trade—the
former being “protectionist” and the latter being “pro-competitive.”67 Yet it does
reflect the view that intellectual property protection aims to serve the broader
interests of society through the encouragement of innovation and creation, and
the transfer of that knowledge to others.68 This latter point will be considered in
more detail below.
An important distinction has been made between the terms “technical
innovation” and “technical invention.”69 The former is taken to refer to a fully
functioning and marketable product that may take the form of an inventive and
completely self-supporting product or process, or it may be an existing product
or process that includes a newly inventive component. By contrast, the term
“invention” is understood to characterize the early implementation of the new
idea or concept itself (i.e., a model or prototype).70 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement’s
use of the term “technological innovation” suggests that the intellectual property
regime it defines is not merely concerned with incentivizing creativity or
inventiveness at its earliest stages, but with incentivizing the production of new
products or processes that can demonstrate some practical application or trading
capability. Prima facie, this preference appears to run counter to the substantive
rules of many national intellectual property systems, patent law in particular.

67. Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade,
4th ed (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013) at 518.
68. Rodrigues, supra note 12 at 44.
69. Robert P Merges, “Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation” (1988) 76 Cal L Rev 805 at 807; Jan Fagerber, “Innovation: A Guide to
the Literature” in Jan Fagerber, David C Mowery & Richard R Nelson, eds, The Oxford
Handbook of Innovation (Norwood, Mass: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 4-8.
70. Merges, supra note 69 at 807.
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While patent law requires that a protectable invention demonstrate some
utility,71 this is not an onerous prerequisite in many jurisdictions.72 As long as the
invention is capable73 of some use in industry or agriculture, evidence of actual
operation in such a setting is not necessary.74 However, as mentioned above,
Article 7 does not directly prescribe any substantive rules. Rather, it imposes a set
of optimized outcomes. Innovation, as a useful end product, yields the greatest
benefits for society and it is this that underscores the Article 7 objective. Invention
without application, while intellectually meritorious, is economically ineffective
as it does not provide the necessary financial incentives for further advancement.
Yet, to impose too high a threshold of utility or industrial application could
undermine the production of innovation. Although patent law sets a low threshold
for industrial application it does so on the basis that too onerous a standard
could undermine the next stated objective of the TRIPS Agreement, namely,
dissemination. Granting patents at the earlier stage of the innovation process
encourages disclosure of the invention and thereby its subsequent utilization in
the ultimate quest for functional results.75

71. For a detailed analysis of the application of the utility requirement between states see
Christopher Wadlow, “Utility and Industrial Applicability” in Toshiko Takenaka, ed, Patent
Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2008) 355; Jay Erstling, Amy M Salmela & Justin N Woo, “Usefulness Varies by Country:
The Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States, Europe and Canada” (2012) 3:1
Cybaris IP L Rev 1.
72. “[An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or
used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.” European Patent Convention, 5 October
1973 at art 57. For example, the UK Supreme Court has accepted that in the context of the
biotech industry it was in some cases sufficient to demonstrate that industrial application was
simply “plausible.” Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly and Co (2011), [2011] UKSC 51
at para 122. See also a discussion of the “weak” utility requirement in US law in E Richard
Gold & Michael Shortt, “The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World”
(2014) 30:1 CIPR 1 at 31-37.
73. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art 27.1.
74. The utility requirement within Canadian patent law has been defined as “a representation
contained in a patent specification, whether implicit or explicit, that the patented invention
will achieve one or more desirable, or will avoid one or more undesirable outcomes.” Gold &
Shortt, supra note 72 at 3 [emphasis added].
75. Thus, many jurisdictions use the requirement of “sufficient disclosure” or “enablement”
to indirectly supplement a weaker utility requirement, thereby simultaneously providing
a safeguard against the patenting of inventions that lack utility and ensuring effective
dissemination of the underlying knowledge. Gold & Shortt, supra note 72 at 31-37.
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Nevertheless, the claim that intellectual property protection can promote
innovation is highly contested.76 It has been noted that levels of intellectual
property protection, as applied in the developed nations, are not likely to
promote innovation in countries that do not have the necessary infrastructure and
capabilities to support such activities.77 In fact, by virtue of their monopolistic
tendencies, intellectual property rights can actually suppress innovation in
both developing and developed countries.78 In this context Article 7 operates
to facilitate equilibrium between the intellectual property system’s incentivizing
capacity and the negative impacts of monopolistic rights.79
One further point that must be made is the curious limitation to certain
types of subject matter—technological innovation. Interestingly, a broad definition
of “innovation” denoting “the introduction of novelties or the alteration of
what is established by the introduction of new elements or forms”80 is wide
enough to encompass all forms of creative activity, i.e. cultural, commercial,
or technological. Does this mean that Article 7 only applies when certain types
of intellectual property are involved, i.e. patents, the layout designs of integrated
circuits, certain trade secrets, and copyright when protecting technical creations
such as software?81 This question is especially pertinent given that the reference to
technology is also repeated in other phrases within Article 7.
Correa writes that the terminology adopted in Article 7 may not signal a
deliberate limitation by those negotiating the Agreement. In fact, it may have been
a mere oversight on the part of the developing countries that were preoccupied
during negotiations with the impact that protection of technology-related
innovation would have upon access to certain products and services.82
76. For an analysis of research in this area see Edwin Mansfield, “Patents and Innovation:
An Empirical Study” (1986) 32 Mgmt Sci 173; Adam B Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation
and its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress,
and What to do About it (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Josh Lerner, “150
Years of Patent Protection” in Robert P Merges, ed, Economics of Intellectual Property Law
(Cheltenahm, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007) 246.
77. Roffe, supra note 27 at 126.
78. The way in which IP protection operates to promote or suppress innovation is complex and
is dependant upon many factors such as the strength and extent of protection, the nature of
the product being protected, and the maturity of the relevant industry. Spence, supra note 46
at 266-271; Jaffe and Lerner, supra note 75 at 56-77.
79. William D Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological
Change (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969) at 76.
80. OED, supra note 40.
81. Correa, supra note 5 at 92.
82. Ibid.
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This reasoning is supported by paragraph 19 of the 2001 Ministerial Declaration.83
This paragraph requires that the objectives and principles, as set out in Articles 7
and 8, guide the Council for TRIPS when examining the relationship between
intellectual property and non-technical subject matter including traditional
knowledge and folklore; and when considering subject matter covered by
the Convention on Biological Diversity. While there is no doubt that patent
law is an important consideration in these relationships, other non-technical
elements of intellectual property law, such as copyright, are also relevant and
are to be informed by the terms of Article 7. Furthermore, the latter objectives
expressed in Article 7 seemingly refer to all intellectual property rights within
the TRIPS Agreement, requiring them to be applied in a “manner conducive
to social and economic welfare” and in a way that achieves “a balance of rights
and obligations.”84
Complications would also arise if Article 7 were deemed to apply only
to technological innovation, as a definition would have to be attributed to
“technology” for the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement. As documented
by commentators and the courts, this approach is fraught with difficulties.
Justine Pila observes:
[T]he term “technology,” which, and as social theorists have again recognized, is too
opaque and elastic to be informative. Indeed, philosophers of technology have noted
the “bewildering variety of ways of understanding the word ‘technology,’” and the
difficulty of formulating a conception that is “neither so general that it risks vacuity
by fitting every conceivable case, nor so specialized that it captures only a tiny range
of the phenomena to be explained.”85

One cannot ignore the possibility that the intention was to limit the
application of Article 7 only to protectable technology. Yet this in no way
diminishes the importance of Article 7 as a structural provision for guiding those
tasked with interpreting the substantive content of the treaty’s provisions. It only
refines its scope.
83. WTO, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 14 November 2001, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, 4th Sess at para 19.
84. Denis Borges Barbosa, “TRIPs art. 7 and 8, FTAs and Trademarks” (9 March 2006) at 6,
online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=889107>; Yu, supra note 12 at 1000.
85. Justine Pila, “On the European Requirement for an Invention” (2010) 41 Intl Rev IP
& Comp L 906 at 918. Justice Phelan of the Federal Court of Canada observes that to
introduce a technology test “would be highly subjective and provide little predictability.
Technology is in such a state of flux that to attempt to define it would serve to defeat the
flexibility which is so crucial to the Act.” Amazon.com Inc v The Attorney General of Canada
and the Commissioner of Patents, 2010 FC 1011, [2010] 4 FCR 541 at para 71.
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4.

“AND TO THE TRANSFER AND DISSEMINATION OF TECHNOLOGY”

Another primary justification for intellectual property protection is the value it
holds for the dissemination of knowledge and the transfer of technology both
nationally and internationally. The utility of the intellectual property system rests
not merely in protecting the interests of the rights holder, but in doing so for the
wider public interest. The protection of intellectual property is often premised
upon social contract theories: Society grants the inventor or creator a selection of
exclusive rights and in return, the inventor or creator grants full disclosure—the
“intellectual property bargain.”86 Thus, the system is of wider interest to society,
which is now free to use that knowledge and information (albeit subject to the
requisite licensing arrangements). This use in turn fosters further innovation,
creation, and improvement.
A distinction must be drawn between transfer and dissemination. While these
two concepts are similar in their objectives—widening access to information—
the transfer of technology has a greater connection with access to information.
Effective intellectual property protection reassures rights holders that their
intellectual assets will be protected and thereby encourages a willingness to
transfer valuable knowledge to others through, for example, licensing agreements
and training programs that see the rights holder and the recipient working in
partnership.87 Dissemination, however, appears to refer to both the informal
mechanisms of information dispersal, such as Internet transmission,88 and the
formal disclosure requirements of the intellectual property system itself, such as
the sufficiency requirement of patent law.89
The promise of international technology transfer in return for stronger
intellectual property standards was a key incentive for developing countries
in accepting the incorporation of intellectual property regulation within the
framework of the WTO.90 Article 7 expressly integrates this objective within the
text of the TRIPS Agreement itself. This provision, together with Articles 8.2 and
66.2, creates a reciprocal obligation for developed nations to actively facilitate

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Fisher, supra note 66 at 20-24.
Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 184-191.
Correa, supra note 5 at 99; Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 189-91.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art 29.1.
See Carlos M Correa, “Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing
Countries?” in Keith E Maskus & Jerome H Reichman, eds, International Public Goods
and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 227.

Slade, The Objectives and Principles of the WTO TRIPS Agreement 968

technology transfer, particularly to those nations in need of assistance to generate
a “sound and viable technological base.”91
However, in promoting the transfer and dissemination of technology, the
narrower understanding of Article 7 may once again impact the provision’s scope.
Nevertheless, the transfer and dissemination of protected subject matter that is
not technological in nature may in fact lead to the transfer and dissemination of
associated technological information and know-how via foreign direct investment
in local production.92 As observed by Michael Spence, if a developing country
provides strong copyright protection for the creative arts, such as film production
or literary publishing, a foreign organization may be willing to set up an operation
in that country and bring with it the technological information and know-how
of the industry.93 In addition, the transfer and dissemination of protected
technological subject matter may be dependent on adequate intellectual property
protection for associated non-technological material, such as trademarks.94 An
organization may be unwilling to licence patented technology without being
secure in the knowledge that its marketing assets will also be adequately protected.
In summary, the inclusion of “the transfer and dissemination of technology”
in Article 7 seeks to remind those implementing and interpreting the Agreement
that the principal objective of incentivizing innovation cannot be understood in
isolation from the equally important objective of dissemination. The diffusion
of knowledge and information must also be understood to emanate from both
formal and informal channels of communication. To ignore or subvert this
objective would disturb the overriding public interest objectives of the whole
intellectual property system.
5.

“TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF PRODUCERS AND USERS OF
TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE”

The objective of mutual advantage for producers and users of technological
knowledge seeks to refocus the nature of the Agreement. While the Preamble
states that an objective of the TRIPS Agreement is the “effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights,”95 this language in Article 7 aims to
reaffirm that higher standards of intellectual property protection are not an end in
91. WTO, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of the Council for
TRIPS of 19 February 2003, WTO Doc IP/C/28; WTO, Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns: Decision of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/17 at para 11.2.
92. Spence, supra note 46 at 272.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1.
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themselves.96 Historical justifications for intellectual property protection regard
the protection of rights holders’ interests as a means to an end: public access
to innovative technological and cultural products.97 As discussed, intellectual
property policy grants rights of exclusion in return for the adequate disclosure of
the protected work.
In addition, this language in Article 7 draws a parallel with the substantive
sections of the TRIPS Agreement. Here Article 7 is concerned with user access,
which is chiefly reflected in the exception provisions, such as Article 13 (copyright),
Article 17 (trade marks), and Article 30 (patents). Correa observes that users
in this context can be taken to mean both the consumers of end products and
producers wishing to use the protected subject matter in their own production
processes.98 Therefore, not only does the TRIPS Agreement provide protection for
producers of technological and cultural products, it also provides for the rights of
the users of such products. Furthermore, users of technological innovation could
refer to many developing countries themselves. As net importers of protected
technologies, they are “largely users of technologies produced abroad.”99 This
means that the requirement of mutual advantage applies not only between
producers and direct consumers, but also between producers and a developing
state’s broader interests.
Having acknowledged that the TRIPS Agreement covers a range of
competing interests, Article 7 rather obscurely identifies how those interests
are to relate to one another. The Agreement is to be interpreted and applied
“to the mutual advantage of producers and users.” Clearly the intention is to
find a balance between the various interests that is equally advantageous to both
producers and users.100 Producers will wish to be guaranteed a sufficient period
of exclusive protection to allow them to recoup their investment. Users will wish
to gain access to the product as soon as possible to further their business or
research. In the case of governments, they will wish to enhance the public interest
as appropriate to their level of development. The balance to be drawn is a fine one
and can be difficult to articulate. Overprotecting creative and innovative products
risks stifling further innovation and delaying the entry of competition into the
marketplace. Yet, a policy that too readily favours users’ access can weaken the
incentive effect of intellectual property protection and reduce innovative and
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Roffe, supra note 27 at 125.
Edwin C Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property” (1989) 18:1 Phil & Pub Aff 31 at 36.
Correa, supra note 5 at 99.
Roffe, supra note 27 at 126 [emphasis in original].
Yu, supra note 12 at 1007 [emphasis added].
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creative output. Further, it could result in creative or technological advancements
being protected by alternative legal means that do not directly facilitate the
dissemination of information (i.e,. trade secret law).101
The challenges in identifying the appropriate balance are heightened when
intellectual property protection stands in the way of achieving important social
welfare objectives. Nevertheless, it is important not to try to over-clarify the
balance required. Over-clarification can result in rigidity in application and
absurdity in outcomes. National development objectives as well as specific factual
situations vary greatly. For example, patent protection is often promoted as vital
for research and development in the pharmaceutical industry, which requires a
period of exclusivity to recoup a company’s substantial investment.102 However,
the effect on those that require access to a particular drug is a question of degree
and varies between states. In some instances the result is expensive, yet still
accessible, healthcare medication. In others, individuals and governments are
unable to purchase the necessary medication, leading to debilitating and often
catastrophic results.103 Hence, national regulatory determinations in accordance
with the level of social and economic development should be respected when
within the boundaries of international legal requirements.
6.

“AND IN A MANNER CONDUCIVE TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELFARE”

The phrase “and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare” has been
held to signify that “the recognition and enforcement of intellectual property
rights are subject to higher social values.”104 The protection of intellectual
property, predominantly influenced by utilitarianism,105 can never mean that all
101. Gervais, supra note 27 at 232.
102. See e.g. Harvey E Bale Jr, “Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation” (1996)
29 NYU J Intl L & Pol 95; Henry Grabowski, “Patents, Innovation and Access to New
Pharmaceuticals” (2002) 5 J Intl Econ L 849. For a contrary perspective see Yi Qian, “Do
National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment?
A Cross-Country Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 1978-2002” (2007) 89 Rev
Econ & Stat 436.
103. See generally Ellen F M ‘T Hoen, “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential
Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond” (2003) online: <www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
topics/ip/tHoen.pdf >. Whilst patents influence access to pharmaceuticals, it is important
not to overemphasise its impact. Bryan C Mercurio, “Resolving the Public Health Crisis in
the Developing World: Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines” (2006) 5 Nw
J Intl Hum Rts 1.
104. Correa, supra note 5 at 99.
105. Maskus, supra note 53 at 28; Landes & Posner, supra note 66 at 11-36; Ruse-Khan, supra
note 43 at 174.
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aspects of intellectual property protection will always be conducive to social and
economic welfare. The rights that are granted by governments and legislature
can and sometimes do have negative consequences, including the entrenchment
of monopolistic practices that run counter to elementary economic policy.
However, this is regarded as a “necessary evil”106 that must be tolerated to bring
about greater economic and social benefits. Granting exclusive rights incentivizes
further creation, innovation, and improvement, which are seen as desirable. The
predominant objective is to achieve a balance between the problems created by
the scarcity of production with the benefits that intellectual property protection
brings for encouraging creation.
7.

“AND TO A BALANCE OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS”

The inclusion of the phrase “and to a balance of rights and obligations” confirms
that intellectual property protection does not exist in a vacuum. Once again the
emphasis is on recognizing that protecting intellectual property rights is not the
ultimate objective,107 but is to be balanced against other obligations arising both
within the TRIPS Agreement and beyond. Accordingly, Member States must
ensure that they implement their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement in a
manner that obtains the correct balance. When it comes to procedural obligations,
the TRIPS Agreement provides some limited guidance as to the correct balance
between rights and obligations. For example, Article 29 places a condition of
disclosure on the grant of patents. However, beyond this procedural guidance,
there is no definitive indication of what the correct substantive balance might be.
We can look to other expressions within Article 7, which promote innovation,
technology transfer and dissemination, and social and economic welfare, but
again these merely establish a desired outcome without clear guidance for
obtaining the correct balance of rights and obligations.
That being said, it is possible to draw some guidance from the rest of
the TRIPS Agreement. The individual subject matter sections of the TRIPS
Agreement establish the nature of the rights that are to be granted. In turn, in each
of the subject matter sections Members may provide for exceptions to the rights
conferred. These exceptions are clearly meant to integrate obligations that arise
to others, and that the Member State deems to be relevant for both economic
and social welfare.108 The exceptions to the substantive rights are generally
106. The “evil” of monopoly markets is however extensively regulated in most states by extensive
competition law and from within IP regimes themselves.
107. Correa, supra note 5 at 101.
108. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts 13, 17, 24.4-24.9, 26.2, 27.2, 30, 31.
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cast in rather ambiguous terms and do not make the relationship between the
rights and exceptions particularly clear. Yet it is here that Article 7 may take
on its most informative role. In interpreting the exceptions in the Agreement
and their relationship with the rights granted, all the terms within Article 7 can
work to guide the interpreter on how to achieve the correct balance of rights
and obligations. The exceptions to the Agreement are the instruments through
which the objectives contained within Article 7 are realized.109 The interpretative
function of Article 7 is supplemented by the same function in relation to Article
8 and by other provisions of the Agreement that seek to control the rights of the
intellectual property owner, such as those relating to anti-competitive practices.110
Article 7 has broader application beyond balancing the rights and obligations
that arise under the TRIPS Agreement itself. Concerns that arise in relation to
rights and obligations occurring outside of the intellectual property and trade
arena need to be addressed as part of the application of Article 7. As noted by
Cottier and Véron, an example of this broader balancing is expressed in Article 16.5
of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This provision requires cooperation
between contracting parties to ensure that patents and other intellectual property
rights support and do not run counter to the Convention’s objectives while
achieving compliance with national and international intellectual property
laws in the area.111
Notably, the decision of the Panel in US – s211 provides significant insight
into what it means for states to achieve a “balance of rights and obligations.”
The Panel observed that:
[A]rticle 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states that one of the objectives is that “the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute…to a
balance of rights and obligations.” We consider this expression to be a form of the good
faith principle…One application of this principle, the doctrine widely known as the
doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s right.112

In a previous paper, I have argued that this statement may lead Article 7
to be recognized as an effective source of legal obligations within the TRIPS
Agreement, invoking both interpretative and substantive commitments under
109. Sisule F Musungu, “The TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” in Carlos M Correa and
Abdulqawi A Yusuf, eds, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement,
2nd ed (London: Kluwer Law International, 2008) at 434.
110. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts 31(k) & 40.
111. Thomas Cottier and Pierre Véron, Concise International and European IP Law: TRIPS, Paris
Convention, European Enforcement and Transfer of Technology, 2nd ed (The Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2011) at 30.
112. US – s211, supra note 16 at para 8.57 [emphasis added].
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the principle of good faith.113 This is a significant development. It assimilates
legal concepts into the TRIPS Agreement that are not explicit within the text,
and expressly recognizes Article 7 as their source. For example, by analyzing the
jurisprudence of the WTO it is possible to identify several good faith corollaries,
such as pacta sunt servanda and the principles of effectiveness and legitimate
expectations.114 These corollaries place obligations on all Member States when
implementing the Agreement, and the judicial bodies when interpreting it.115 In
addition, the doctrine of abus de droit, as a derivative of the good faith principle,
may give rise to substantive obligations even though such obligations are again
not expressly acknowledged within the text of the Agreement. Consequently,
by connecting Article 7 with the principle of good faith, the panel in US- s211
legally obliges Member States and those interpreting the Agreement to conduct
a balancing of rights and obligations. This significantly increases the relevance of
this provision and its future application.
However, it must be emphasized that Article 7 is not a tool for eroding the
rights granted under the TRIPS Agreement, but for controlling those rights in
a way that facilitates achievement of the other objectives expressed in Article 7.
As noted by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss:
[Article 7’s] endorsement of the goal of promoting technological innovation and
achieving the “mutual advantage of producers and users” equally safeguards right
holder’s interests in effective protection. Thus, a member state might challenge a
provision that undermines the innovative environment on the ground that it shifts
the balance too far in favor of users. Article 7 is, in short, not a commitment to any
particular vision of intellectual property.116

Nevertheless, as noted above, it is a commitment to national autonomy:
[Article 7] is a structural commitment that helps define the parameters in which
members states can make different intellectual property choices appropriate to their
needs.117
113. For a detailed analysis of the implications of the Panel’s decision in US – s211 see
Slade, supra note 9.
114. The principle of legitimate expectations within the context of the TRIPS Agreement
has been limited to non-violation complaints, which are currently expressly excluded.
India – Pharmaceuticals, supra note 37 at 36-42. A moratorium against non-violation
complaints is currently maintained in accordance with articles 64.2 and 64.3 of the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1.
115. Slade, supra note 9.
116. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 3 at 111.
117. Ibid. See also Antony Taubman, A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 17.
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B. SUMMARY

Article 7 articulates the objectives of the intellectual property system that have up
to this point been implicit within both national and international systems. Their
express inclusion within the TRIPS Agreement therefore provides significant
insight into the intentions of the drafters of the Agreement. As recognized
by Pedro Roffe:
In litigation concerning intellectual property rights, courts commonly seek
the underlying objectives of the national legislator, asking the purpose behind
establishing a particular right. Article 7 makes clear that TRIPS negotiators did not
intend to abandon a balanced perspective on the role of intellectual property rights
in society.118

The clear intention is to position intellectual property not only within the
context of the WTO trading system but also within the wider context of national
development. Article 7 ensures that the objectives as stated are not forgotten or
ignored in the push for internationally liberalized trade.
As a set of interpretative principles, these objectives permit and arguably
require legislative and legal interpreters to target national intellectual property
laws towards achieving the stated outcomes. They logically facilitate domestic
flexibility over intellectual property strategy.119 Although Article 7 does not give
authority to renegotiate the terms of the TRIPS Agreement,120 it does authorize a
degree of variation between Member States to accommodate other national and
international policies. In its role of promoting innovation, dissemination, social
and economic welfare, and a balance of rights and obligations, Article 7 expresses
an equal responsibility towards the protection of intellectual property rights and
the wider community. That responsibility may also carry legal consequences in
the form of the principle of good faith.

II. ARTICLE 8—PRINCIPLES
Principle: A fundamental truth or proposition, on which many others depend; a
primary truth comprehending or forming the basis of, various subordinate truths; a
general statement or tenet forming the (or a) ground of, or held to be essential to, a
system of thought or belief; a fundamental assumption forming the basis of a chain
of reasoning.121
118.
119.
120.
121.

Roffe, supra note 27 at 126.
Yusuf, supra note 43 at 13.
Canada – Pharmaceuticals, supra note 13 at 7.25.
OED, supra note 40.
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The dictionary definition of “principle” emphasizes the foundational nature of
the proposition being advanced. It makes clear that a principle is to be regarded
as the motivational force behind the line of thought or the course of action being
championed. In this regard, Article 8 is complementary to Article 7 in that it
underlines the motive and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore,
if we take this understanding of principle and place it into the context of a legal
agreement we can see that the more general understanding can now be refined
into that of a legal norm.
Legal principles are recognized as “general, basic or underlying assumptions
or precepts [that] embody fundamental regulatory purposes or values and provide
a broad guide for the development of legal rules.”122 Hence, they are distinct
from legal rules, which lay down a series of explicit rights and obligations that
are “applicable in an all or nothing fashion.”123 As highlighted in the dictionary
definition above, principles articulate the fundamental basis or truth of any legal
system.124 In that regard, we can isolate two functions for legal principles. First,
they encompass legal concepts that guide the application of the relevant rules.
Secondly, they validate, justify and thus legitimize the scope of any legal regime.
To ignore legal principles “implies offence not only to a specific command, but
to the whole system of commands.”125
As a guide to the application of legal rules, principles step in to fill the textual
gaps that are an inevitable reality of any legal system. It is impossible to provide
explicit guidance for every eventuality that might be encompassed by its rules.126
This is especially so in the international arena where the inherent difficulties in
reaching agreement on often complex subject matter leads to ambiguity or even

122. Andrew D Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) at 7.
123. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1977) at 24.
124. For a detailed discussion on the distinction between rules and principles please refer to the
renowned works of Dworkin, supra note 123 at 22-45. In a response to Dworkin see Joseph
Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81 Yale LJ 823; John Braithwaite,
“Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty” (2002) 27 Aust J Leg Phil 47; Mitchell,
supra note 122 at 7-23.
125. Rodrigues, supra note 12 at 44, quoting Celso Antonio Bandeira de Mello, Curso de direito
administrative, 17th ed (Brazil: Malheiros, 2004) at 841-42.
126. Mitchell, supra note 122 at 2.
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silence in relation to many of the rights and obligations included.127 Hence, the
most significant role for legal principles rests in providing more or less broadly
defined guidance for identifying the correct interpretation to be attributed to an
ambiguous rule.
The TRIPS Agreement consists of both principles and rules. In the preamble to
the TRIPS Agreement, Members recognize “the need for new rules and disciplines
concerning the provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the
availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights” and “the
need for a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with
international trade in counterfeit goods.”128 These principles exist in addition to
the structural principles that traverse all WTO treaties, such as trade liberalization,
non-discrimination, and special and differential treatment.129
Therefore, it would appear fortunate for the process of treaty interpretation
that in addition to the substantive rules of the Agreement, Members took
steps to define a set of principles within the operative section of the text. These
principles are to apply when a Member State chooses to adopt measures pursuant
to those expressed within Article 8. This approach would mirror that adopted in
relation to other provisions within other WTO Agreements such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For example, Article XXXVI of the
GATT, entitled “Principles and Objectives,” has been held out as containing
horizontally applicable principles. Notably, paragraph 8 expresses the principle
of non-reciprocity130 and, as stated in the explanatory notes, “This paragraph
would apply in the event of action under Section A of Article XVIII, Article
XXVIII, Article XXVIII bis,... Article XXXIII, or any other procedure under
this Agreement.”131
Article 8, like Article 7, acknowledges the need for the socio-economic
optimization of intellectual property regulation. It implicitly recognizes that
intellectual property protection often demands interventionist action to ensure
127. Joost Pauwelyn & Manfred Elsig, “The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and
Explanations across International Tribunals” in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Mark A Pollack, eds,
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the
Art (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 447.
128. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1 [emphasis added].
129. Meinhard Hilf, “Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?”
(2001) 4 J Intl Econ L 111 at 117-21.
130. Non-reciprocity means less-developed contracting parties should not be expected, in the
course of trade negotiations, to make contributions that are inconsistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs. See GATT, Text of the General Agreement, GATT
Doc 55 UNTS 194, at art XXXVI
131. Ibid.
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that it does protect and/or promote social and economic objectives. Nevertheless,
unlike Article 7, Article 8 expressly authorizes State Parties to take specific action in
pursuit of explicit, yet broadly defined, policy objectives.132 Consequently, Article
8 would appear to be of greater substantive value than its neighbouring provision,
Article 7. As observed by Carlos Correa, “Article 8 thus confirms the broad and
unfettered discretion that Members have to pursue public policy objectives.”133
However, Article 8 was clearly not intended to be an exception to the
exclusive rights granted by the Agreement. Both paragraphs of Article 8 require
that any measures adopted by Members must be consistent with the rest of the
Agreement. Yet, it is important to assert that the consistency requirement should
not overwhelm the application of this provision. To argue otherwise portrays
intellectual property protection as ascendant over other national policies, and
risks making Article 8 a superfluous provision contrary to established principles
of international law. This cannot be the case.134 As will be shown from the analysis
of the terminology adopted, Article 8 articulates the significant discretion that
Member States hold, even in light of the consistency requirement, to accommodate
other important socio-economic objectives. In doing so, Article 8 articulates
principles that clearly assist in interpreting and applying the substantive rules of
the Agreement. The most significant of these principles are national regulatory
autonomy, consistency, necessity, and reasonableness.
A. THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 8.1
1.

“MEMBERS MAY, IN FORMULATING OR AMENDING THEIR LAWS AND
REGULATIONS, ADOPT MEASURES NECESSARY”

The opening phrase of Article 8 plainly recognizes the independence State Parties
have to institute suitable measures to control some of the negative consequences of
intellectual property protection. These consequences can arise either as a result of
an intentional manipulation of the system or as an intrinsic side effect of granting
exclusive rights protection. The opening phrase also recognizes that intellectual
property rights should not form a barrier to the regulation of other social and
economic policy objectives. Measures to control the negative consequences of
intellectual property protection include the adaptation of intellectual property

132. Correa, supra note 5 at 108; Gervais, supra note 27 at 237.
133. Correa, supra note 5 at 108.
134. Slade, supra note 9 at 363-71.
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laws themselves,135 but may also include controls in other areas that impact
upon the exercise of intellectual property rights, such as price controls and safety
standards.136 However, as the measures relate to the formulation or amendment
of “laws and regulations” it can be assumed that administrative actions could not
be justified under Article 8.1.137
The measures that may be taken could ostensibly support an increase in the
levels of intellectual property protection. The key requirement is that the law be
directed towards achieving the stated purposes, that is to promote public health
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to their socio-economic and technological development. This requirement
is supported by Article 1.1 which states that “Members may, but shall not be
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required
by the Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions
of this Agreement.”138 For example, enhanced protection of traditional knowledge
is directly aimed at attaining the stated objectives because it seeks to preserve
traditional lifestyles and improve livelihoods, to conserve the environment,
benefit national economies, and prevent bio-piracy.139 Nevertheless, Article
8.1 could be most influential as an instrument to overcome the obstacles to
development created by intellectual property protection. Therefore, an effective
operationalization of this provision would likely see a reduction in the level of
protection afforded.
The use of the term “necessary” within Article 8.1 mirrors the wording
within other WTO texts, where, as the “necessity test,” it functions to control

135. Aspects of TRIPS that provide flexibility for such measures include the exceptions to the
rights granted (articles 13, 17, and 30); the lack of definitions for many of the substantive
requirements (i.e. article 27 requires patentable subject matter to be new, involve an inventive
step and be capable of industrial application); and, in relation to patent law, article 31
provides for the grant of compulsory licences.
136. Correa, supra note 5 at 104; Andrés Moncayo von Hase, “The Application and Interpretation
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” in Carlos M
Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS
Agreement (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2008) at 117.
137. Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 195.
138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1 [emphasis added].
139. Carlos M Correa, “Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Issues and Options
Surrounding the Protection of Traditional Knowledge” (2001) The Quaker United Office
at 5-10, online: <www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/tkcol3.pdf>; Graham Dutfield, Intellectual
Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (London: Earthscan 2004) at 97-100.
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the autonomy State Parties have to ensure non-trade objectives.140 It attempts to
distinguish between those national measures that legitimately pursue a non-trade
objective (and as a consequence create barriers to free trade) and those protectionist
policies that merely masquerade as sanctioned trade exceptions. It does this by
ensuring that domestic measures that restrict trade are only tolerated if they are
necessary to mitigate the obstruction of a fundamental national policy objective.
For this reason, it is evident that the necessity test in Article 8.1 is a limitation
placed on Member States when acting under the authority of this provision.
Another limitation is the “consistency” proviso, which will be discussed below.
Necessity, as interpreted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
objectively requires that the domestic measure pursue a policy expressed within
the relevant provision. In the case of Article 8.1 this means public health and
nutrition, or the promotion of the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to socio-economic and technological development. However, the jurisprudence
of the WTO dictates that domestic measures that restrict trade will only be
considered necessary (and thus WTO compliant) where, as summarised by
Ruse-Khan, “they consist of the least trade restrictive measure; which is reasonably
available to the Member State; and is equally effective in achieving the desired
policy objective.”141 The Appellate Body has confirmed that it is not essential
to show that the measure is indispensable to achieving the objective; a more
lenient and deferential approach has been adopted. In Korea – Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh Chilled and Frozen Beef, the Appellate Body confirmed that this
approach involves a “weighing and balancing” of several factors, including “the
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or
regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected

140. Key WTO provisions that contain a necessity requirement include Articles XX and XI
of the GATT; General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) Articles XIV and VI:4,
paragraph 2(d) of Article XII and paragraph 5(e) of the Annex on Telecommunications;
Articles 2.2 and 2.5 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”); Articles 2.2
and 5.6 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS);
Articles 3.2, 8.1 and 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement; and Article 23.2 of the Agreement on
Government Procurement.
141. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Assessing the need for a General Public Interest Exception
in TRIPS” in Annette Kur, ed, Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) at 189-90 [emphasis in original]. For a detailed
analysis of the DSB’s approach to the necessity test see Rodrigues, supra note 12 at 44-63.
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by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation
on imports or exports.”142
The Appellate Body in United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline has acknowledged that the measure adopted to pursue
the Member State’s policy objective, not the objective itself, is the focus of the
necessity requirement. This approach leaves Members free to determine their
own policies in relation to objectives expressed.143 The level of self-determination
was further enhanced in European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products when the Appellate Body confirmed that State
Parties also retain the “right to determine the level of protection [in relation to
the relevant policy] that it considers appropriate in a given situation.”144
Having observed that only the measure itself is justiciable, not the policy
objective, it is important to note that the underlying policy is considered relevant
when adjudicating the necessity of the measure in question.145 The “weighing and
balancing” exercise offsets the relative importance of the national interest being
advanced against the effectiveness of the measure and the extent of its impact upon
trade.146 Sarah Joseph has observed that in the above cases “the Appellate Body has
signalled a great willingness to concede the necessity of impugned measures when
public health issues are at stake.”147 As considered below, this is significant for the
application of the necessity test in Article 8.1, where “public health” is prominent
amongst the listed objectives. And while the WTO has stressed that Members
must “respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered
agreements,”148 one would assume this includes the necessity requirement, which

142. Korea—Measures Affecting the Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Complaint by
Australia and the United States) (2000), WTO Doc WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R
(Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org>.
143. US – Gasoline, supra note 7 at 29; WTO, “Necessity Tests” in the WTO: Note by the Secretariat,
WTO Doc S/WPDR/W/27, online: WTO <docsonline.wto.org> [“WTO Necessity Tests”].
144. European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products
(2001), WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<docsonline.wto.org>.
145. Panagiotis Delimatsis, “Who’s Afraid of Necessity? And Why it Matters?” in Aik Hoe Lim &
Bart De Meester, WTO Domestic Regulation and Services Trade: Putting Principles into Practice
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 97-98.
146. Ibid at 98.
147. Sarah Joseph, Blame it on the WTO?: A Human Rights Critique (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011) at 113. See also Adam McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights
(Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2010) at 125.
148. US – Gasoline, supra note 7 at 29; “WTO Necessity Tests,” supra note 143.
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clearly mitigates the level of respect commanded when acting in the interests of
public health and the other interests outlines in Article 8.1.
Much of the case law in this area deals with the necessity standard as required
by the General Exception provisions in Article XX(b) and (d) of the GATT, and
Article XIV of the GATS. However, it would not be accurate to presume that
the interpretation applied to the necessity requirement in these instruments can
be directly transposed onto the TRIPS Agreement. In fact it has been supposed
that the necessity requirement in Article 8.1 is not as restrictive as that in Article
XX of the GATT.149 This is because Members, in “promot[ing] the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development,” would appear to have “significant room to define domestically the
content and scope of the measures they can adopt.”150 The Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health also supports the broad mandate expressed in Article 8
insofar as it declares that “the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health.” It is also noteworthy that State Parties
did not deem it necessary to restrict state action in this regard by including a
requirement of necessity within the Doha Declaration.151
This understanding aside, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that
Article 8.1 is an exceptions provision like Article XX of the GATT and Article
XIV GATS. While all three articles include a list of potentially trade-restrictive
measures that Members may adopt, together with a necessity requirement, only
the General Exceptions in the GATT and GATS allow Members to directly
override their obligations under the Agreements.152 Article 8.1 is constrained by
the requirement that all measures must be “consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement.”153 As a result, it would appear that Members may only adopt
such public interest measures if they can find sufficient space within the TRIPS
provisions to do so.154

149. “WTO Necessity Tests,” supra note 143. In contrast, Panagiotis Delimatsis states that “the
GATT/WTO interpretation of the concept of necessity has converged across the WTO
Agreements.” Yet, his analysis only considers the GATT, GATS, TBT, and SPS Agreements,
with no reference being made to the TRIPS Agreement. Delimatsis, supra note 145 at 96.
150. Correa, supra note 5 at 107.
151. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11; Yu, supra note 12 at 1016.
152. The measures that can be taken under Article XX of the GATT must conform to the
“chapeau” to avoid arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. A similar proviso is included in
Article XIV of the GATS.
153. Roffe, supra note 27 at 126; Gervais, supra note 27 at 238.
154. Ruse-Khan, supra note 141 at 195.
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Therefore, while the underlying function of the necessity test is to
constrain the amount of discretion Member States have in relation to public
policy objectives, its limiting effect may be inconsequential by comparison to
the obligation of TRIPS consistency. Hence, if a measure is consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement it is unlikely to be challenged irrespective of its necessity to
achieve the stated objective.155 Nevertheless, the necessity requirement may have
greater application should non-violation complaints become recognized within
the context of the TRIPS regime.156
Unlike violation complaints, which involve a breach of the terms of a WTO
treaty, non-violation complaints arise when a state alleges that the expectation
of a “benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly...is being nullified or impaired”
or “the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded” by
“the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement.”157 Therefore, Member States
may bring a complaint before the DSB where the action being taken by another
Member is not illegal per se (i.e., it does not violate an express treaty term), yet it
denies a legitimately expected gain arising from the Agreement.
Notwithstanding the present inapplicability of non-violation complaints in
the context of the TRIPS Agreement,158 it is clear that Article 8 may prove to be
most valuable in this context. Member States that wish to adopt TRIPS-consistent
measures pursuant to the objectives expressed within this provision, such as price
controls, licensing restrictions, or packaging requirements, can use this provision as
a defence against a claim that they were impairing the legitimate benefits expected
under the TRIPS Agreement.159 As explained below, Article 8 is an expression of
155. Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 117.
156. A moratorium against non-violation complaints is currently maintained in accordance with
articles 64.2 and 64.3 TRIPS Agreement.
157. GATT, Article XXIII. This article also provides for “situation complaints.” However, there is
currently no jurisprudence on the application of this provision to the GATT and it has been
suggested that these complaints are of little if any relevance. Petros C Mavroidis, “Remedies
in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place” (2000) 11:4 EJIL 763 at
790-91. Therefore, situation complaints will not be covered in this analysis.
158. Articles 64.2 and 64.3 of the TRIPS Agreement contain a temporary five-year moratorium
on bringing non-violation complaints. This temporary restraint has been extended on
numerous occasions. In December 2015, a decision was made to continue the moratorium
until the Eleventh Ministerial Conference in 2017. WTO, TRIPS Non-Violation and
Situation Complaints, WTO Doc WT/MIN(15)/41.
159. Frederick M Abbott, “Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment Causes of Action under
the TRIPS Agreement and the Fifth Ministerial Conference: A Warning and Reminder”
(2003) Quaker United Nations Office, Occasional Paper No 11 at 2, online: <http://www.
geneva.quno.info/pdf/QP11-nv.pdf>.
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the expectations of Members in relation to the Agreement and thus “indicates
that [Members] were reasonably expected to adopt such TRIPS-consistent
measures.”160 The only restraint that could have a significant bearing would be
the necessity test, which would operate to ensure that the adopted measure did
not exceed what was objectively justified in the circumstances.
2.

“TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND NUTRITION”

Article 8.1 makes clear that the measures taken by Member States are to be
directed to achieving certain ends, the first being to protect public health and
nutrition. As stated by the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.161

This Declaration supports the ability of State Parties to take measures in
support of public health162 that may, in fact, limit the grant and protection of
intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, the scope of Members’ discretion
is seemingly constrained by the second sentence in the Declaration, which
acknowledges the use of flexibilities within the Agreement itself for achieving
public health objectives.163 This interpretation would appear to be in harmony
with the requirement in Article 8.1 that any national measures are consistent
with the provision of the TRIPS Agreement. However, as will be discussed below,
this may not be as restrictive as it first appears.

160. Federick M Abbott, “The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha
Ministerial Conference” (2001) Florida State University College of Law Working Paper No
36 at 26, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=285934>.
161. WTO, supra note 11 at 4.
162. Public health in this context must be given a broad meaning. It should extend beyond
pharmaceutical products to incorporate all IP that has some application within the public
health sector. See Pires de Carvalho, supra note 26 at 209.
163. Roffe, supra note 27 at 132.
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3.

“AND TO PROMOTE THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SECTORS OF VITAL
IMPORTANCE TO THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT”

The second purpose to which Member States may direct their necessary measures
is promotion of the public interest in sectors that are vitally important to their
socio-economic and technological development. It is immediately evident
that national measures, in this context, need only promote the public interest
rather than actually achieve the stated objective.164 As a result, any challenge to
the legitimacy of such action will be hard to establish. It is also clear from the
language used that the scope of the second objective is extremely broad. Given
that the measures adopted may include those within the scope of the intellectual
property regime and those without, Correa has highlighted the significant
room this provides for Member States when implementing and adapting their
intellectual property policies.165
The “public interest” is a phrase often used to rationalize political,
governmental, and legal decision making at both the national and international
level.166 Yet, it is a concept that appears devoid of a precise definition.167 The
Oxford English Dictionary identifies it as “the common well-being.”168 It is
broadly understood to convey the message that the action or inaction in question
has been undertaken because society as a whole will derive a benefit. As we have
seen, intellectual property and trade are certainly sectors within which the public
interest can be advanced. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not attempt to
define any optimum levels of well-being to be targeted. In fact, it would be wrong
to suppose that the public interest could be subject to an internationally recognized
measure or definition. While political debates and judicial interpretations often
provide context-specific understandings of the term,169 perceptions of common
well-being and the philosophical origins of the public interest inevitably vary
amongst states. National perceptions of public interest are tied to economic,
cultural, political, and historical influences that are as numerous as they are

164. Correa, supra note 5 at 105.
165. Correa, supra note 5 at 105-106; Ruse-Khan, supra note 141 at 173; Roffe, supra
note 27 at 127.
166. John D Montgomery, “Public Interest in Ideologies of National Development” in Carl J
Friedrich, ed, The Public Interest (New York: Atherton Press, 1962) at 220.
167. Gerhard Colm, “The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy” in Carl J Friedrich, ed,
The Public Interest (New York: Atherton Press, 1962) at 115.
168. OED, supra note 40.
169. Colm, supra note 167 at 127.
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variable.170 Accordingly, the public interest is a reference point that policy makers
can only legitimately begin to determine at the national level.171
Turning to the phrase “of vital importance,” once again it is only the
individual Member States that can determine which sectors are of vital importance
to their own socio-economic and technological development, and thus where to
take relevant action. While the term “vital importance” would seem to stress the
imperative nature of the sector in question, it is only the Member State that can
determine which sectors are important to their socio-economic and technological
development.172 As observed by Peter Yu, the only significant restriction on scope
seems to come from within Article 27.1 of the patent provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, which requires non-discrimination as to “the place of invention, the
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”173
He emphasizes, however, that this provision may not be relevant where sectors are
identified not on the basis of their technological specialty but on the basis of their
size or stage of development (e.g., infant or small to medium-sized businesses).174
Finally, the phrase “socio-economic and technological development” must be
seen to cover all aspects of a nation’s growth, and reflects the objectives outlined
in the fifth recital of the Preamble to the Agreement.175 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to conceive of an area of development that would not fall within the
categories of social, economic, or technological, or an area of intellectual property
that would not be impacted by action taken under Article 8.1.176 When deciding
whether a sector is of vital importance it is therefore possible for a Member State
to look beyond the traditional indicators of development, such as Gross Domestic
Product, income levels, and total employment, and towards social indicators such
as levels of health and education.177 As discussed above in relation to Article 7,
technological development is a fundamental objective of intellectual property
protection and the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, Article 8.1, together with Article 7,
underscores that intellectual property protection can never prevail where doing
so undermines other development objectives.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Montgomery, supra note 166 at 218.
Roffe, supra note 27 at 127; Correa, supra note 5 at 105.
Correa, supra note 5 at 106; Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 196.
Yu, supra note 12 at 1011.
Ibid at 1011-1012.
Cottier and Véron, supra note 111 at 32.
Cottier and Véron, supra note 111 at 33.
Correa, supra note 5 at 106.
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4.

“PROVIDED THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT”

The most controversial expression within Article 8 has proved to be the requirement
that the measures adopted be consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Article 8
makes national autonomy to adopt appropriate measures conditional upon their
compliance with the rest of the Agreement. At first sight it would be reasonable to
conclude that Article 8.1 is therefore almost redundant in application. However,
this conclusion is drawn from too strict a reading of the consistency proviso.
While Article 8.1 may not be a general exception provision analogous to Article
XX of the GATT, this does not mean that the provision is insignificant. Together
with Article 1.1 and Article 7, this provision has been described as a “functional
substitute” to the General Exception provision of the GATT.178 Like Article 7,
Article 8 has an interpretative function.179 It guides the national legislator when
faced with implementing the often ambiguously worded substantive rules of the
TRIPS Agreement. If we analyze the consistency requirement of Article 8 in light
of the conditions placed upon the grant of exceptions to the exclusive rights,
we can see that consistency may not, in fact, be so hard to achieve given the
uncertain nature of the exception provisions. For example, copyright limitations
and exceptions should “not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work;”180
copyright and trademark exceptions must “take account of the legitimate interests
of the owner;”181 and patent exceptions must “not unreasonably conflict with the
normal exploitation” of the right and must “not prejudice the legitimate interest
of the owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”182 In this
interpretative role, Article 8 skews in favour of the wider public interest when
it comes into conflict with intellectual property policy.183 How the exceptions
within the TRIPS Agreement are interpreted is important for giving practical
application to the principles expressed in Article 8.184
In addition, Article 8 governs the interaction between intellectual property
regulation and measures taken outside of intellectual property law and policy,
such as competition regulation and public health. Correa notes that it would
be illogical to suppose that the consistency requirement should prevent any
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 3 at 89.
Roffe, supra note 27 at 126; Abbott, supra note 159 at 27.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art 13.
Ibid, arts 13, 17.
Ibid, art 30.
Moncayo von Hase, supra note 136 at 119.
Musungu, supra note 109 at 434.
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TRIPS-inconsistent measures to protect the national interests outlined in Article
8.1, as this would see intellectual property rights gain ascendency over other
national policy objectives.185 In support of this opinion, the Doha Declaration
on TRIPS and Public Health affirms that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Yet, as discussed, this
is seemingly limited by the second sentence of paragraph 4, which reaffirms
Members’ right to use the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement for this
purpose. In addition, the Doha understanding only relates to matters of public
health and is not directly relevant to the other policy objectives expressed within
Article 8.1.186 In these situations there is no express support for dispensing with the
consistency requirement. Nevertheless, Correa is right to argue that intellectual
property protection should not and does not assume primacy over other policies.
In which case, it may be better to acknowledge that the consistency requirement
is there not because negotiators intended intellectual property rights to trump
other national policies, but as an indicator that there is sufficient room within
the other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to accommodate those policies
while also respecting the protection of intellectual property rights.187 Therefore,
returning to the first point above, Article 8.1 is an interpretative tool that asserts
that Members have the right to favour other policies should the national situation
so dictate, and that any challenge to Members’ discretion should carry the burden
of establishing that the measure is inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.188 As
observed by Andres Moncayo von Hase, “Articles 7 and 8 impose on Members
the correlative obligation to refrain from questioning acts of other Members
that make use of the freedom conferred to them by the said provisions.”189
Consequently, the consistency proviso appears to merely determine the outer
limits of that discretion rather than removing it completely.190
185. Correa, supra note 5 at 108.
186. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss argue that “while the declaration was made in the context of a
health crisis and precipitated an amendment to the Agreement, [it] was…not confined to
that context and was viewed as explaining-not modifying-the Agreement”. Supra note 3 at
110. In which case, the ability of Members to derogate from their obligations under TRIPS
extends not only to public health, but also to the other policy objectives listed. See Pires de
Carvalho, supra note 27 at 206-13.
187. As noted by Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, “[the consistency] language is puzzling but it is highly
significant because, in fact, it confirms that the Agreement as a whole is flexible and furnishes
states with considerable room to manoeuvre.” Supra note 3 at 111.
188. Roffe, supra note 27 at 126; Correa, supra note 5 at 108.
189. Moncayo von Hase, supra note 136 at 118.
190. Yusuf observes that “the consistency test was apparently considered necessary in view of the
broad nature of the public interest principle.” Supra note 43 at 14.
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Importantly, when assessing the consistency of such measures it must be
remembered that Article 7, and its requirements of social and economic welfare
and a balance of rights and obligations, must be taken into account as the objectives
of the TRIPS Agreement.191 “Consistent with the provisions of this Agreement”
means all the provisions, including Article 7. Therefore, the consistency enquiry
cannot ignore that the optimum levels of intellectual property protection relate
to national levels of development, as required by Article 7, which must necessarily
include “public health and nutrition” and “socio-economic and technological
development.” A national measure that may appear inconsistent with some of
the standards expressed within the TRIPS Agreement may not be considered
inconsistent with the Agreement if read as a whole.192
In conclusion, the consistency requirement means that Article 8.1 is not
a general exceptions provision akin to Article XX of the GATT, as it does not
generally authorize Members to override the obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement (notwithstanding that the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health may make an exception for public health policies) and it appears to have
no substantive application on its own.193 However, it does not prevent Members
from adapting their intellectual property laws to accommodate the stated policy
concerns where ambiguity or flexibility exists within the substantive provisions
of the Agreement. As long as one or more of the stated objectives is the genuine
intention behind the measure and the measure is not a disguised attempt to
weaken the protection provided by the TRIPS Agreement, states are free to act.194
B. ARTICLE 8.2
1.

“APPROPRIATE MEASURES, PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE CONSISTENT
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, MAY BE NEEDED”

While Article 8.1 authorizes measures “of a positive nature,” Article 8.2 authorizes
Member States to take “defensive” action to prevent or resolve any adverse
consequences created by the behaviour of intellectual property rights owners.195
Like Article 8.1, this provision requires that national measures taken upon the
authority of this provision must be consistent with the rest of the Agreement.
Therefore, competition law should not be used as a hidden restraint on the rights
191. Correa, supra note 5 at 104, 110; Yu, supra note 12 at 1014; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra
note 3 at 110-111.
192. Yusuf, supra note 43 at 14.
193. Cottier and Véron, supra note 111 at 32.
194. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 3 at 111.
195. Correa, supra note 5 at 110.
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provided by the TRIPS Agreement.196 In this regard, the discussion in relation to
the consistency proviso in Article 8.1 is equally relevant here.
One noticeable difference between the authorization provided by Articles
8.1 and 8.2 is that the former requires such measures to be “necessary,” whereas
the latter requires the measures to be “appropriate” and “needed.” Given that the
term “necessary” denotes a specific legal norm within the WTO and “appropriate”
does not, it is possible to presume that Members may be afforded greater
autonomy when it comes to adopting measures under Article 8.2, subject to the
consistency requirement. Gervais advances the argument that “‘appropriate’ refers
to the need for correlation between the measure (nature and proportionality)
and the abuse or unreasonable restraint that is its target.”197 If this correlation
requires a proportionality-type assessment similar to that discussed in relation
to the necessity test then there would seem little reason for departing from the
terminology adopted in Article 8.1.198 Hence, it would seem logical, and in
accordance with principles of treaty interpretation, to conclude that “appropriate”
signifies a lesser level of scrutiny for national measures. An alternative explanation
for this distinction may be that, unlike the policy objectives listed in Article 8.1,
Article 40 of the Agreement covers the control of anti-competitive practices in
contractual arrangements in some detail. This makes it unnecessary for Article
8.2 to include a further limitation when the discretion afforded to Member States
is controlled by another provision. It must be noted, however, that the level of
direction afforded by Article 40 is far from comprehensive.
The term “needed” has been equated with “necessary” in Article 8.1,199 and
there is certainly a relationship between the ordinary meanings of both terms.
Yet, once again we must question why State Parties chose to depart from the
use of the word necessary and thus the established WTO necessity principle if
there was no intention to adopt a different benchmark. It is reasonable to argue
that “needed” may merely refer to a requirement for Member States to show that

196. Frederick M Abbott, “Are the Competition Rules in the WTO TRIPS Agreement Adequate?”
(2004) 7 J Intl Econ L 687 at 692.
197. Gervais, supra note 27 at 239-240. See also Pires de Carvalho, supra note 27 at 213.
198. Interestingly, in his book on WTO principles, Mitchell equates the term “necessary” in
Article 8.1 with a proportionality type analysis, but does not do the same with the terms
“appropriate” or “needed” in Article 8.2. Mitchell, supra note 122 at 180 (Table B).
199. Gervais, supra note 27 at 239.
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some action was required and thus the measure was adopted in good faith.200
Nevertheless, what is clear from the discussion below is that Member States can
only intervene under this provision when the activities of private owners produce
negative effects for competition, trade, or technology transfer.201
2.

“TO PREVENT THE ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS BY
RIGHT HOLDERS”

The TRIPS Agreement was introduced to remedy perceived distortions to
competition that a lack of adequate intellectual property protection was having in
the market place.202 In this regard intellectual property protection is an important
aspect of a competitive trading environment.203 Yet, the exclusive rights granted to
intellectual property owners can also be abused to produce negative consequences
for trade and competition both nationally and internationally.204 Indeed, during
the Uruguay Round, it was this aspect alone that India felt needed regulating
by the GATT. As stated by the Indian delegation, “it is only the restrictive and
anti-competitive practices of the owners of intellectual property rights that can be
200. In a more recent article, Gervais has noted the overlap that exists with the “necessity”
requirement in Article 8 and the “justification” test in Article 20 of TRIPS. Yet,
he acknowledges that justification may not be as stringent a requirement as the necessity
test—“justification may be interpreted as meaning that the measure should implement the
stated objective without necessarily being the least trade restrictive.” This same reasoning
may be equally applicable in distinguishing between “necessity” and “needed.” Daniel
Gervais, “Analysis of the Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging Rules and the
TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention” (2010) Report prepared for Japan Tobacco
International, online: <www.smoke-free.ca/trade-and-tobacco/Resources/Gervais.pdf>.
201. Hanns Ullrich, “Expansionist Intellectual Property Rules and Reductionist Competition
Rules: A TRIPS Perspective” in Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman, eds, International
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalised Intellectual Property Regime
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 726 at 732.
202. Thomas Cottier and Ingo Meitinger, “The TRIPs Agreement without a Competition
Agreement?” (2003) Fondazone Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No 65-99, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=200622>.
203. Andreas Heinemann, “Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPs Agreement of
the World Trade Organisation” in Fredrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker, eds, From
GATT to TRIPS: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, vol 18
(Munich: VCH Publishers, 1996) 239 at 241.
204. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the General Court
has on several occasions addressed the issue of “abuse of a dominant position” in relation to
the exercise of IPRs. See e.g. C-241-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television
Publications Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR I-743; C-418/01
IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-5039;
T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-3601.
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considered to be trade-related because they alone distort or impede international
trade.”205 Consequently, the initial proposals to incorporate provisions relating
to anti-competitive practices came from developing countries.206 The opening
recital to the TRIPS Agreement seeks to balance appropriate levels of intellectual
property protection and competition regulation.207 In this regard, WTO Members
see the regulation of intellectual property rights in accordance with competition
policy as essential to ensure the effectiveness of the system.
Article 8.2 allows the overall balance between intellectual property protection
and competition rules to be resolved at the national level. It neither attempts to
define what practices are to be considered abusive, nor stipulates what measures
Members should adopt. It once again exhibits deference to national policy makers
to tailor rules and principles to suit national circumstances.208 This is an approach
favoured by some commentators who view WTO regulation of competition rules
as potentially restrictive for many nations and the WTO unsuitable for the task.209
In discussing the impact of implementing multilateral rules and principles on
competition policy, Correa maintains that “[t]he best option for [developing]
countries may be to keep the possibility of establishing their competition regimes,
according to their own situation and policy objectives, without being bound to
rules that may be enforced through the WTO settlement mechanism.”210
The ability to control abusive practices can be addressed from within the
TRIPS regime itself. As noted above, there is significant ambiguity in many of
the substantive rules to allow Members to adopt pro-competitive intellectual
property policies. In addition, Article 40 authorizes Members to regulate
205. GATT, Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from India, GATT Doc MTN.GNG/
NG11/W/37; See also Roffe, supra note 27 at 121.
206. GATT, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, India,
Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, GATT Doc MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71.
207. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1.
208. Ullrich observes that the reservation maintained in favour of preserving national autonomy
in relation to competition policy and rules may be a concession made by developed nations
following the collapse of negotiations in relation to a Code of Conduct for the Transfer of
Technology. Ullrich, supra note 201 at 731-32.
209. Daniel K Tarullo, “Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy” (2000) 94
AJIL 478; Cecilia Oh, “Trade and Competition Policy in the WTO” (2003) Third
World Network Briefings for Cancun, online: <www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/article/
trade-and-competition-policy-wto>. See also Keith Maskus and Mohamed Lahouel, who
argue that a multilateral agreement incorporating minimum standards on competition policy
would benefit developing countries. “Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries” (2000) 23 World Economy 595.
210. Correa, supra note 5 at 112.
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anti-competitive licensing practices of rights holders;211 Article 6 on exhaustion
of rights allows Member States to adopt their own policy and regulation on the
matter;212 and the rules on fair use and compulsory licensing, for example, also
expressly assist to counter abusive practices.213
Beyond intellectual property policy, abusive practices can be subject to
varying degrees of national regulation. The abuse of rights is a concept that has
been notoriously difficult to universally define. In the absence of a multilateral
agreement on competition rules and policy,214 members are free to determine
what practices are to be defined as abusive and how to regulate them.215 Thus,
taken together with Article 7, Article 8.2 would allow Member States to utilize
competition rules to ensure that intellectual property rights holders are not
over-compensated in relation to their social and economic contribution.
3.

“OR THE RESORT TO PRACTICES WHICH UNREASONABLY RESTRAIN
TRADE”

Here again Article 8.2 is formulated to allow Member States the autonomy to
regulate the practices of private business. The intention is to prevent activities that
impact the fundamental objective of WTO policy—unrestricted trade.216 There
is clearly an overlap between this objective and the previous concern over abuse of
211. Article 40 is again a permissive provision as it does not define specific competition rules.
It merely identifies example practices that may amount to abuse of rights, such as “exclusive
grant back conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package
licensing.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1.
212. This autonomy was reaffirmed in the WTO, Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra
note 11 at 5(d).
213. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art 31(c), 31(k). The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health reinforces the right of Member States to grant compulsory licences and
the freedom of each state to determine the grounds upon which the licences are granted.
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11.
214. For a detailed discussion on a possible WTO Agreement on competition rules see e.g.,
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private
Business: A ‘Trade Law Approach’ for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO”
(1996-1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 545; David J Gerber, “Competition Law and the
WTO: Rethinking the Relationship” (2007) 10 J Intl Econ L 707.
215. Heinemann cautions against placing too much reliance on the interpretation of “abusive” in
different contexts. To do so may lead “to a premature narrowing of the scope of application.
To cite an example, to equate ‘abuse’ with the meaning of the same term in Art [102] of the
[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] would fail to recognise that in the latter
Treaty a dominant market position is required, whereas Art. 8(2) merely requires the existence
of a right in the field of intellectual property, which does not necessarily entail a dominant
position in the relevant market.” Supra note 203 at 243.
216. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1.
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rights. Yet, the ability to control abusive practices would appear to be wider given
that some abusive practices may not in fact be considered anti-competitive, and
thus may not be an unreasonable restraint on trade, whereas any anti-competitive
practice will always be abusive.217
The term “reasonable” (and its variations, including “unreasonably”) appears
more than 200 times in the legal texts of the WTO and over 30 times in the
TRIPS Agreement.218 It is often used as a means to limit the nature and extent
of measures States are authorized to take.219 As in Article 8.2, States are only
authorized to act if the practice in question unreasonably restrains trade. Within
the context of the TRIPS Agreement, Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg observe
that the unreasonableness of an action or inaction requires an assessment of
whether or not it is “proportionate or within the limits of reason.”220
Whether a practice unreasonably restrains trade appears to require the
Member State to undertake an investigation into the actual impact the conduct
has upon trade before adopting any pro-competitive measures that may negatively
affect intellectual property rights. As emphasized by the much quoted Justice
Brandeis in the 1918 US Supreme Court decision in Chicago Board of Trade v
United States, every contractual agreement restrains trade to some extent, but
only those that do so unreasonably warrant legal scrutiny.221 What amounts to
unreasonable restraint was articulated in what has become commonly known as
the “rule of reason” doctrine:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
217. Correa, supra note 5 at 111; Yusuf, supra note 43 at 15. See also Pires de Carvalho, who
observes that while selling at different prices to different consumers based on unreasonable
grounds of discrimination (i.e. the football team supported) is not anti-competitive, it may
certainly be considered abusive practice. Supra note 27 at 232.
218. Graham Cook, “Reasonableness in WTO Law” (2013) 1 Latin Am J Intl Trade L 713 at 714.
219. For example, the TRIPS Agreement (articles 13, 26, and 30) only allows exceptions to be
introduced when, inter alia, they “do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests” of
the rights holder. Supra note 1 [emphasis added]. The GATS Annex on Telecommunications
section 5(g) states that “a developing country Member may, consistent with its level of
development, place reasonable conditions on access to and use of public telecommunications”
[emphasis added].
220. Sam Ricketson & Jane C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The
Berne Convention and Beyond, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 776.
While the authors make this statement in relation to Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention,
it is applicable in the context of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
expressly incorporates articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention into the Agreement.
221. Board of Trade of Chicago v United States, 246 US 231 at 238 (US Supreme Court, 1918).
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consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts. This in not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.222

While this private law doctrine has necessarily evolved over time and finds
application in many jurisdictions, the essence of the analysis remains true today.223
Therefore, this established balancing test would appear equally applicable for
WTO Members when making a determination as to whether certain restrictive
intellectual property practices warrant regulatory measures.224
4.

“OR ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY”

Conduct of intellectual property owners that could affect the international
transfer of technology includes many of the licensing practices covered by
Article 40 and the grant of compulsory licences in accordance with Article 31.
As expressed in Article 7, one of the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement is the
“transfer and dissemination of technology.” This was a key factor in persuading
many developing countries to agree to the incorporation of the TRIPS Agreement
into the legal framework of the WTO. Given that the main source of technology
transfer for many developing countries is that acquired overseas,225 it was crucial
that developing Members be given the tools to ensure, as far as possible, that
the promised benefits of intellectual property protection would accrue. In this
regard, Article 8.2 and Article 66.2 are important provisions that seek to promote
the international transfer of technology.226 Yet it is only the former provision that
places credible control in the hands of all recipient nations.

222. Ibid.
223. For an analysis of how the “rule of reason” has developed in the United States see Andrew
I Gavil, “Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in
Practice” (2012) 85 S Cal L Rev 733. For an analysis of the rule of reason doctrine within
European Union see Annette Schrauwen, ed, Rule of Reason: Rethinking another Classic of
European Legal Doctrine (Groningen, The Netherlands: Europa Law Publishing, 2005).
224. Gervais, supra note 27 at 240; Cottier and Véron, supra note 111 at 36.
225. Musungu, supra note 109 at 445.
226. The importance of Article 66.2 was given emphasis in the WTO Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, supra note 11.
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C. SUMMARY

In allowing Member States to adopt measures in relation to certain policy
objectives, Article 8 appears to have greater substantive authority than Article
7, its neighbouring provision. Yet this authority is curtailed by the inclusion of
a consistency requirement. While the controls of necessity and reasonableness
merely seek to ensure that the measures adopted are not disguised restrictions
on trade, the consistency requirement seemingly prevents Article 8 from having
freestanding authority to directly override other obligations expressed within the
TRIPS Agreement. But just how restraining is that rule? The policy objectives
expressed within the provision are wide in scope and not clearly defined, leaving
Members significant discretion regarding how to develop that policy. In addition,
the provisions within the Agreement that Members could use to support a
consistency argument, e.g. Articles 13, 17, 30 and 40, are themselves open to
broad interpretation in light of the objectives and principles expressed in Articles
7 and 8. As noted by Reichman, “[i]n principle, both the public interest exception
and measures to prevent abuse, respectively stipulated in Article 8(1) and 8(2) of
the TRIPS Agreement, could justify resort to compulsory licensing.”227 Therefore,
the consistency requirement may not be as restrictive as it first appears.
Accordingly, the true value of Article 8 rests in its ability to guide the
interpretation of other provisions of the Agreement. Many provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement are vague and uncertain in legal application and thus would
benefit from the guidance provided by Article 8, if only to authorize deference
to national standards where such measures are adopted in good faith. Therefore,
Article 8 is a complementary provision to Article 7 that is important for framing
not only intellectual property laws but also rules relating to other public interests
such as health and competition.228

227. Jerome H Reichman, “Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement” in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi
A Yusuf, eds, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2008) at 34.
228. Correa, supra note 5 at 104.
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D. IDENTIFIED PRINCIPLES OF LAW

The WTO Panel in EC – TMs & GIs acknowledged that “Article 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement sets out the principles of that agreement.”229 This acknowledgement
is important in understanding the legal authority of this provision. As observed
by Andrew Mitchell, “a text supporting two readings should be interpreted in a
manner consonant with a treaty’s underlying principles.”230 Thus, when specific
legal principles can be identified within the text of an agreement they inevitably
carry greater interpretative weight than the more general expressions of object
and purpose,231 notwithstanding that the interpretation and application of these
legal principles is still influenced by the overall object and purpose of the treaty.
While the panel in EC – TMs & GIs did not identify any specific legal
principles emanating from Article 8, it is clear from the above analysis that
each of the requirements of consistency, necessity, and reasonableness operate as
legal principles. In this role they guide the application of the relevant legal rules
and, in doing so, validate and justify the scope of the Agreement. Yet, it would
be wrong to let the nomenclature of Article 8 be so restrictive as to deny that
same role to its neighbour, Article 7. As mentioned above, the Panel in US –
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 characterized the phrase “[t]he
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute...to
a balance of rights and obligations” contained within Article 7 as a “form of the
good faith principle.”232
In addition, it is also possible to identify a legal principle that finds its origins
in the language of both Articles 7 and 8. The principle of national regulatory
autonomy or sovereignty is clearly a guiding principle in several key policy areas,
such as health and competition, and when implementing the often ambiguous
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed throughout this article,
the policy objectives of the TRIPS Agreement can only be truly defined and
balanced at the national level. While the principles of consistency, necessity,
and reasonableness may limit the scope of that autonomy, any challenge to the
229. EC – TMs & GIs, supra note 14. For a contrary perspective see Pires de Carvalho, supra
note 27 at 193-94.
230. Andrew D Mitchell, “The Legal Basis for Using Principles in WTO Disputes” (2007) J Intl
Econ L 795 at 806-807.
231. As noted by Isabelle van Damme, “Principles of treaty interpretation are neither rules nor
principles in the classic sense of ‘something…which underlies a rule, and explains or provides
the reason for it.’ They underlie the interpretation of the rule, not the rule itself.” Isabelle van
Damme, “Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body” (2010) 21 EJIL 605 at 616.
232. US – s211, supra note 15.
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principle of national regulatory autonomy must necessarily carry the burden of
establishing the action or inaction as inconsistent, unnecessary, and so on.
The legal principles so far identified as being expressed within both Articles
7 and 8 are reasonably unambiguous in their objectives and relatively familiar
to judicial adjudicators. However, this is not to say that their boundaries and
application are easy to define. Caution must be stressed in an intergovernmental
organization such as the WTO, where the Dispute Settlement Understanding
makes it clear that the “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”233
Nevertheless, this caution must be balanced against the need to recognize the
legal and interpretative principles articulated by its members. Given that these
principles are expressed within Articles 7 and 8, it is significant that the terms of
reference of the DSU require that any matter of dispute be examined “in the light
of the relevant provisions” of the covered agreements.234
In summary, legal principles are plainly expressed within both Articles 7 and
8, although only the principle of good faith has been definitively recognized by
the DSB. While the above analysis is not conclusive, it is reasonable to presume
that the legal principles that have been identified can effectively function to guide
the interpretation of the substantive rules of the Agreement. This guidance derives
from a direct use of the legal principle to shape the applicable rule. If applied in
this way, the legal principles articulated in Articles 7 and 8 give expression to the
broader intentions of all the parties to the Agreement. Articles 7 and 8, therefore,
demarcate the scope of the Agreement and legitimize its application amongst all
Member States. They also provide the foundation for some of the expectations
that Members should derive from the implementation of the Agreement and
are therefore important provisions should non-violation complaints become an
aspect of the TRIPS Agreement.

III. CONCLUSION
In conceptualizing the meaning and function of Articles 7 and 8 from the language
of the text, it seems evident that these provisions should be of fundamental
importance in defining the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. As expressed by
Meinhard Hilf: “Any established rule in a legal system should be an expression
of a finely tuned balance between the underlying principles and objectives.”235
233. DSU, supra note 24, art 3.2.
234. Ibid, art 7.1.
235. Hilf, supra note 129 at 112.
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This approach is in accordance with the general rule of treaty interpretation
expressed in Article 31 of the VCLT, which requires inter alia that a treaty be
interpreted in light of its object and purpose. Therefore, Articles 7 and 8, entitled
Objectives and Principles, provide a system that calibrates the rest of the TRIPS
Agreement. Analysis of the text also confirms that this process of calibration can
only sensibly be achieved at the national level given the breadth and complexity
of social and economic issues in question. Therefore, where ambiguity exists
within the provisions of the Agreement, deference must be given to the individual
choices of member states, as long as the choices are aimed at achieving the goals
articulated in Article 7 or are authorized by Article 8.236
In addition, the outcomes that these provisions seek to achieve reflect
a balance of interests arising from an extensive period of negotiations and to
ignore them makes it “very hard to make a good faith argument that the TRIPS
Agreement was a legitimate bargain between developed and less-developed
countries.”237 As tools for validating and justifying the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement, they also implicitly incorporate the development goals of the
WTO.238 Yet this is not to misconstrue these provisions as instruments that only
have value for the less developed membership of the WTO. Clearly Articles
7 and 8 also reflect intellectual property policy that has long been a staple of
national regimes. Whether as expressing legal principles, legitimate expectations
or defining the outcomes of an optimised intellectual property regime, these
two provisions provide important interpretative guidance to all members and
institutions of the WTO. Greater trust in the value of the TRIPS Agreement can
only be achieved through the application of its objectives and principles, which
can only effectively be applied once a better understanding has been articulated.
It is hoped that this article goes some way to providing much clarity to the text,
such that legal and political representatives can have greater confidence in the
Agreement’s future application. Given that the text of Articles 7 and 8 is being
steadily replicated in other intellectual property agreements, it is only through
an understanding of these objectives and principles that we fully appreciate how
international intellectual property regulation is to function.

236. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F Lowenfeld, “Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together” (1997) 37 Va J Intl L 275 at 304;
Frankel, supra note 9 at 393-94.
237. Yu, supra note 12 at 1023 [emphasis in original].
238. Roffe, supra note 27 at 130.

